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Abstract
Whether ‘employee ownership’ takes the form of worker cooperatives, co-
ownership or simply employee share ownership plans, there are normally high
expectations that a range of positive outcomes will result. Yet many empirically
based studies tend to ﬁnd a much more complex picture. An inﬂuential segment
of that empirical literature has posited the need for a number of mutually
reinforcing workforce management components to be in place alongside co-
ownership. Drawing on detailed case research in two large and successful co-
owned retailers in Spain and Britain this paper examines the role of these
wider elements supporting employee ownership.We ﬁnd that employee ownership
can be linked to higher productivity and lower employee turnover, while at the
same time being linked to higher absenteeism and mixed effects on attitudes.
Expectations held by managers and employees are higher; these expectations
are not always fully met. The role of managers was also found to be crucial.
1. Introduction
One of the many rationales advanced as justifying employee-owned
enterprises is the idea that workers in such enterprises will be more engaged
and more productive. The suggestion is that workers in such enterprises will
think and behave differently: the essential nature of that difference being that
they can be expected to act more like ‘owners’. This means, for example, that
they will be more customer (and market) focused as they see the customer
rather than the boss as the source of their economic futures; they would also
be expected to be willing to make sacriﬁces in hard times in order to sustain
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the enterprise. They would be expected to expend ‘discretionary effort’. In
managerial language, they might be expected to be more willing than an
employee in a conventional ﬁrm, to ‘go the extra mile’.
Many studies ﬁnd that employee-owned ﬁrms derive favourable effects in
terms of satisfaction, motivation and behavioural measures such as lower
absenteeism and reduced labour turnover (Bakan et al. 2004; Brown et al.
1999; Kruse et al. 2004, 2010; Long 1980, 1982; McCarthy et al. 2010; Oliver
1984). Moreover, studies also ﬁnd that these ﬁrms have higher productivity
on average (O’Boyle et al. 2016). But other studies ﬁnd neutral effects or even
ﬁnd lower levels of satisfaction and higher levels of absenteeism (Arando et al.
2011; Blasi et al. 2008; Keef 1998; Kruse 1984; Rhodes and Steers 1981).
Existing research reports generally fail to explain the reasons for such
dispersed and mixed results. Kruse and Blasi (1995: 25) considered that the
mixed results remained unexplained because ‘research has only scratched
the surface of the range of other human resource policies that might
produce positive complementarities with employee ownership’. The purpose
of this paper is to get beneath that surface. We draw upon the results of a
detailed comparative study of behaviours in two large retailers with employee-
ownership characteristics in order to trace the precise impacts of ‘membership’
of an employee owned enterprise. We did this by locating the study of such
behaviours in the context of wider economic factors and the wider array of
human resource management policies and practices.
One of these retailers, Eroski, is based in Spain and is part of the
Mondragon Cooperatives group, the other, the John Lewis Partnership, is
based in the UK and is by far the largest co-owned enterprise in that country.
We analyse the results from employee surveys conducted over multiple years
in both companies and we examine behavioural responses using measures
such as productivity, absenteeism and voluntary turnover. Our analysis
complements the existing literature by also reporting on the reasoning used
by managers to account for employee attitudes and behaviours. This adds an
extra dimension to the understanding of the employee ownership model as
does the attention we pay to the wider economic context over time.
The John Lewis Partnership (JLP) has twomajor business units: John Lewis
department stores and Waitrose supermarkets. JLP employs nearly 90,000
‘partners’, mainly in its 48 John Lewis department stores and shops and
in the 350 Waitrose supermarkets and branches. In the 1930s, the founder,
John Spedan Lewis, took the highly unusual step of giving away a large
portion of his ownership of the business to his employees by placing his
shares in a trust using an ‘irrevocable settlement’ (Lewis 1954). The stock
as a whole rests with the Trust. Managers and workers talk routinely of this
arrangement as a co-owned business. The founder also created a checks-
and-balances governance system, set out in a Constitution. In the founder’s
own words, he was embarking on ‘an experiment in industrial democracy’
(Lewis 1948). Partner inﬂuence and voice is based on a series of elections to
representative bodies. Nearly all employees are Partners but in recent years
some outsourcing arrangements and innovative company to company joint
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enterprise arrangements have resulted in some workers being non-members.
This division has triggered internal debate and concern.
Eroski S.Coop was founded in 1969 as a result of the merger of ten small
consumer cooperatives located in the Basque Country. In the early 1990s,
Eroski began a regional expansion to other parts of Spain, opening new
hypermarkets and acquiring many supermarket chains. As a result of this
expansion, Eroski Group became the biggest company in Mondragon and
the third largest food retailer in Spain. This growth path has changed since
2008 as a consequence of the economic crisis. There has been a reduction in
the number of employees from 52,711 in 2008 to 33,832 in 2014.
Eroski is a consumer and worker cooperative with by-laws that give
consumer-members and worker-members equal representation on its elected
governing bodies. There are two governing authorities: the General Assembly
and the Governing Council with both consumer and worker members
being represented on each. The main business of the Eroski Group is
concentrated in hypermarkets and supermarkets, although the Group has
diversiﬁed into new businesses including drugstores, petrol stations and sports
equipment stores. In the last two decades, Eroski has employed three kinds of
employees: (i) ‘cooperative owners’, mainly located in the cooperative parent
company Eroski S.Coop; (ii) employees with partial ownership (often found
in subsidiary companies) and (iii) employees without ownership.
In 2013, 33.7 per cent of Eroski employees were ‘employee owners’. Of these,
the composition was as follows: 8,196 of them were cooperative owners of
the parent company EROSKI S.Coop., 3,632 were cooperative owners of the
second order subsidiary cooperative EROSKI Hipermercados S.Coop.,1 and
467 were employees with partial ownership of the subsidiary Gespa Forum
sport stores. Themajority of people working for Eroski are employees without
ownership. This has been the case for the last 20 years (Storey et al. 2014).
The different kinds of employees working for Eroski are of particular interest
for this research since they allow for a revealing comparative analysis in a
controlled way of the link between ‘ownership’ and outcomes as measured
by behaviours and attitudes.
2. The positive and negative effects of employee ownership
Several systematic reviews of the literature that analyse the links between
employee ownership and employee attitudes and behaviours (Caramelli 2011;
Kaarsemaker and Poustma 2006; Kruse 2002; Kruse and Blasi 1995) tend to
conﬁrm that there is no automatic effect of employee ownership on employee
attitudes and behaviour. Those studies ﬁnd mixed results and highlight the
need for new research to account for contingency relationships such as
organizational strategy, the internal ﬁt between employee ownership and the
HRM system, and wider contextual factors.
The arguments used by advocates of employee ownership to justify their
mainly positive view of the correlation between employee ownership and
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attitudinal and behavioural responses, are largely based on agency theory.
Linkage of employee remuneration and rewards to corporate performancewill
align employees’ interests with those of their employer thereby encouraging
them to exert more effort, share information, and cooperate with managers
and peers to promote the success of the company (Pendleton and Robinson
2010). Within this paradigm, tying employee incentives to ﬁrm performance
is expected to heighten employee morale, provide a direct motivation for
individual effort, and furnish a rationale for mutual monitoring (Bonin et al.
1993). Greater employment security offered by employee-owned companies is
also seen as a motivational factor (Blair 1995; Kramer 2010; Pendleton and
Robinson 2010).
Klein (1987) presented threemodels of the psychological effects of employee
ownership. The ﬁrst, the ‘intrinsic satisfaction model’, suggests that a sense of
employee ownership is, in itself, sufficient to increase employees’ commitment
to, and satisfaction with, the company. The second, the ‘instrumental
satisfaction model’, suggests employee ownership must be matched with an
increase in the opportunities for worker participation in decision making.
The third model, ‘extrinsic satisfaction’, suggests that employee ownership
increases commitment if it is materially rewarding to employees.
Klein (1987) found no support for the intrinsic satisfaction model, but her
results did lend support to the extrinsic and instrumental satisfaction models.
She noted that ‘there must be an intervening variable — ﬁnancial gain or
participative management or both— for employee ownership to be associated
with employee satisfaction and commitment’ (1987: 329).
The ‘instrumental satisfaction’model has been the subject ofmuch research.
Many researchers underscore the necessity of complementing employee
ownership with an increased employee participation in decision making in
order to increase satisfaction and commitment. So, the ‘complementary
hypothesis’ is that there is a mutually reinforcing effect that derives from
ownership and inﬂuence. Nevertheless, as Kaarsemaker and Poustma (2006)
and Pendleton and Robinson (2010) observe, the empirical evidence for
the apparent link between employee ownership and its positive impact on
participation is still remarkably weak.
Kruse et al. (2004) propose a ‘three prong hypothesis’ which adds innovative
human resource policies to the mix. This suggests a positive interplay between
ownership, participation in decision making, and supportive HR policies.
Kruse et al. (2004) using data from 14 ESOP companies, ﬁnd positive evidence
for this hypothesis (2010) relating worker-reported outcomes to ownership,
participation and HR policies that encourage participation and reduce the
free riding problem. According to Kruse et al. (2010) and Kurtulus and
Kruse (2017), satisfaction increases when shared capitalism is combined
with increased participation in decision making and with high-performance
HR policies (e.g. being in an employee involvement team, job security
and training) and low levels of supervision. Explaining the model even
further, Kaarsemaker and Poustma (2006) consider that in order to create
an ‘Ownership High-Performance Work System’, employee ownership needs
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the additional presence of ﬁve core HRM practices: participation in decision
making; information sharing; training for business literacy; mediation and
proﬁt sharing.
Among the factors of employee owned companies that can generate
negative effects on employee attitudes and behaviours, the risk of ‘free-riding’
is the most cited (Bonin et al. 1993; Klein 1987; Kruse et al. 2004; McCarthy
et al. 2010; Pendleton and Robinson 2010). Given that ﬁnancial rewards are
shared with co-owners, as the number of employee owners grows, the link
between an individual’s effort and the reward he or she receives becomes
weaker and the risk of shirking or free-riding increases. The opportunity
to free ride ‘can undermine even the best ownership incentive . . . destroying
employee morale’ (Kruse et al. 2004: 105).
Another potential source of dissatisfaction in employee owned companies,
especially for risk averse, low paid and economically insecure workers, is the
extra risk that employee ownership implies to the income of partners (Blasi
et al. 2010; Kruse and Blasi 1995; Kuvaas 2003). Raised and not fulﬁlled
expectations among employee owners may also cause negative outcomes
(Arando et al. 2011; Ben-Ner and Jones 1995; Klein and Hall 1988; Kruse
and Blasi 1995; McCarthy et al. 2010).
Employment security is normally expected to have a positive effect on
employee attitudes and behaviours, but Blasi et al. (2008) ﬁnd higher
absenteeism rates among employee owners and suggest that ‘it may be’ that a
greater sense of job security underlies those results. According to Long (1982)
andKruse (1984), a process of ‘involvement deterioration’ over time can occur
in employee owned companies. This implies that a lack of impact might result
from a taken-for-grantedness of the ownership status. Its saliency can subside
unless active steps are taken to periodically refresh the idea.
In the research reported below, we seek to take this body of literature
forward by presenting evidence of positive and negative outcomes of employee
ownership in two large comparator ﬁrms, and by digging deep into the
reasoning which managers bring to the evidence they have before them. We
analyse their practical theorising of the links between the employee owned
models they promote and the behavioural results which they monitor.
3. Methodology
One distinctive feature of the study design is that it combines positivist
methods with interpretivist methods. The cases we investigated met the
guidance offered by Stake (1994), that is, they offer signiﬁcant opportunities
to learn about the issues under investigation. Having access to knowledgeable
informants, and to rich and longitudinal quantitative data of the two biggest
employee owned retail companies in the world, offered the possibility to gain
rich insights. Choosing those two companies also highlighted a key issue,
given that one of them (JLP) has been very commercially successful, while
Eroski has faced many problems since 2008. As these two different economic
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situations can themselves affect attitudinal and behavioural responses, we have
included quantitative data over extended periods.
We gathered quantitative data from diverse sources. In Eroski we had access
to the results of the 2008 hypermarket employee satisfaction survey answered
by 4,328 employees and to a more complex culture–leadership–satisfaction
survey conducted in 2011 and answered by 23,543 employees. Eroski offers
the possibility of conducting between-groups cross-sectional comparisons of
attitudinal and behavioural responses of employee owners and non-owners
because it employs considerable numbers of each category. We also gathered
data on absenteeism and voluntary turnover rates for cooperative owners and
non-owner employees for the 2005–2014 period.
In the case of John Lewis, we had access to the results of the 2011,
2012 and 2013 Partner Surveys. The survey results in John Lewis include
a comparison of the responses given by partners with responses to similar
questions in surveys conducted by an external benchmarking sample of
1,824,040 employees working for 337 large organizations.2 Additionally, we
were able to correlate results from the attitude surveys with behavioural results
such as absenteeism and productivity from selective stores.
Wewere not able to conduct regressions because we didn’t have direct access
to the micro data of those surveys. Instead we relied on the data owners,
the HR managers of both companies, to provide tabulations and run the
descriptive statistics we requested.
Armed with the accumulated data on employee behaviours and attitudes
we interrogated managers about their own interpretations of the data and
the ways in which they made sense of the data. Beyond that, using interview
techniques, we inquired into their intended strategies and their rationales. We
constructed a common framework to research the two cases and drew on our
extensive background knowledge of both cases extending over 10 years. The
initial comparative framework was iterated between the two research teams in
the United Kingdom and Spain and then applied to both JLP and Eroski. In
the most recent phase of our work with John Lewis, interviews took place
over a 24-month period. Interviews were conducted with members of the
main board and also with members of the management boards of John Lewis
(department stores) and Waitrose (supermarkets). Further interviews took
place with senior managers in ﬁnance, logistics, human resource management
and other central functions. A total of 25 managers were interviewed. All
interviews were recorded and transcribed. Further, we were allowed access
to the archives and from these a very detailed timeline was constructed which
revealed variations in business policy and democratic arrangements over time.
Additionally, we were able to observe managerial and board meetings.
In Eroski, 11 interviews were conducted with senior managers. We placed a
special focus on human resource policies and practices. In order to reinforce
the longitudinal view for the case of Eroski we also interviewed the former
president for the period 1995–2011 and used the data emerging from four
conferences held between 2011 and 2015 with the currently serving president,
the chief executive officer and the former president. Each of these interviews
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and events were recorded, transcribed and used in the research. An additional
interview was held in February 2016 with the researcher in Mondragon
University in charge of conducting the culture–leadership–satisfaction survey
in Eroski and in other Mondragon cooperatives.
As recommended in the literature (Gibbert et al. 2008), in order to increase
the reliability of our analysis of the interviews, two peers not co-authoring the
paper independently analysed the transcripts of the interviews and discussed
and reviewed the draft of the paper. With the same purpose in mind, a
review of drafts was also made by key informants in both companies between
December 2015 and January 2016.
4. Results
For each case we consider: productivity; employee turnover and
attitudes/satisfaction levels.
Eroski
(a) Productivity
According to managers in Eroski, productivity measured both by sales per
employee and by sales per square meter, has normally been higher in the
cooperative business than in subsidiaries without cooperative members. Data
is shown in Table 1 for the 2008–2015 period.
As Table 1 shows, productivity in the parent company has been higher than
in subsidiaries every year from and including 2008 to 2015. The same pattern
occurred in the pre-crisis 2001–2007 period. The gap has been reduced in the
2008–2015 period mainly due to the sale or closure of deﬁcit stores in the
subsidiaries. The reduction of stores in subsidiaries has also resulted in a
reduction in the sales of the cooperative parent company to its subsidiaries,
thus reducing the productivity of the cooperative parent company.
So, in headline terms, there is clear evidence that productivity is indeed
higher in the employee-owned parts of the organisation. However, it is
necessary to dig deeper in order to consider other variables. For example,
productivity ratios can be inﬂuenced by other factors such as the different
sizes and kinds of stores in the cooperativized business and in the subsidiaries.
Productivity comparisons need to be conducted comparing stores of similar
size and kind. Such a comparison is available from research data from 2006
and 2007. This revealed that monthly average sales per employee were 34 per
cent higher in Eroski coop hypermarkets than in partially employee owned
hypermarket subsidiaries. In the case of supermarkets, sales per employee were
39 per cent higher in coop stores than in supermarkets partially owned by
employees and 41 per cent higher than in stores with no employee partnership
(Arando et al. 2014, p. 45).
However, all of the managers we interviewed contended that, as far as they
were concerned, there is no scientiﬁc study that fully convinces them that the
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higher productivity of the cooperativized business can be unequivocally be
attributed to its cooperative nature. For example:
We have data that shows that there is higher productivity in stores with cooperative
members than in stores with non-members. Are these differences because the
employees are members or due to differences in the geographical areas where
those stores are? If the stores where the majority of members are, are located in
a region where we are leaders, where we have higher sales per square meter, logically
productivity is higher in those stores. Simply because there is more activity. (Eroski
Manager 1)
Nevertheless, many of the interviewees – including the President, the CEO,
and the managers of the area of human resources tended to hold to a belief
that the cooperative nature did impact on behaviour. So, for example:
Wewant to cooperativizise the subsidiaries, because we believe that at this cooperative
stage there are much higher levels of engagement in all professional levels, particularly
in stores. We also believe there are differences in intangible elements, such as strictly
relational elements, the way in which the stores have some positive energy, a positive
energy that is transmitted by the people that work in the organization they co-
own and therefore feel they are working for themselves. That is an absolutely
unique competitive advantage, it is not imitable by other organizations. And so we
know that there’s a certain differential element between the cooperativized business
and the non-cooperatived one, although there is no scientiﬁc study that correlates
the higher productivity of our cooperativized business with its cooperative nature.
(Eroski manager 6)
Thus, the interim conclusion from the productivity data is that there
is a prima facie case that the cooperative characteristics are conducive to
positive productivity outcomes, but that because of confounding variables, it
is necessary to dig deeper to gain a more rounded assessment.
(b) Labour Turnover
Lowvoluntary turnover rates were considered as one indicator of commitment
among coop members in the Mondragon cooperatives by Bradley and Gelb
(1982). According to our interviewees, 30 years after those studies, voluntary
turnover rates of coop members in Eroski are still lower than that of non-
members and lower than those of other food retailers in Spain. Comparative
data on labour turnover are shown in Table 2.
Unfortunately, the data does not differentiate between voluntary and
involuntary turnover. But the HRmanager and other informants were able to
make interpretations of the data that helped distinguish the roles of voluntary
and involuntary turnover.
High turnover rates are found among temporary employees, but it is
difficult to read too much into this because often this group is hired on very
short term contracts. Informants attributed the higher turnover of temporary
employees in years previous to the crisis (2005–2007) to higher voluntary
turnover. Both in the economic boom and in the crisis years, turnover rates of
permanent employees and employees with partial ownership have been low,
C© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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TABLE 2
Average Monthly Labour Turnover Rates in Eroski (2005–2014)
Coop owners in
Eroski S. Coop.
Employees with
partial ownership
(since 2012 coop
owners of second
degree coop)
Employees without ownership
Na % Monthly
turnover
Na % Monthly
turnover
Na3 % Monthly
turnover
permanent
employees
% Monthly
turnover
temporary
employees
2005 6,930 0.20% 3,878 0.70% 12,293 0.31% 19.60%
2006 6,994 0.21% 4,215 0.85% 13,111 0.72% 23.03%
2007 7,199 0.21% 4,595 0.79% 24,846 1.33% 27.15%
2008 7,709 0.25% 5,319 0.55% 33,296 1.06% 14.88%
2009 7,916 0.25% 5,523 0.54% 28,807 0.88% 16.74%
2010 7,518 0.25% 5,092 0.66% 26,786 1.09% 15.61%
2011 7,351 0.20% 4,835 0.78% 24,284 0.65% 14.56%
2012 7,227 0.13% 4,270 0.48% 23,228 0.61% 16.40%
2013 7,166 0.15% 3,564 0.28% 22,173 0.70% 16.09%
2014 6,979 0.08% 3,504 0.34% 21,810 0.39% 16.44%
aEquivalent full working day employees.
Note: % of people of the total workforce who ceased their labor relationship with the company
during the month (and are not hired again in the same month).
Source: Data gathered from the company.
and even much lower in the case of the parent company cooperative owners.
Those low turnover rates reﬂect low voluntary turnover in both collectives.
The low turnover of coop cashiers and professionals was seen as a sign of
commitment and also as a response to a suite of human resource policies,
mainly pay policy (since the salaries of the majority of members are higher
than the market), proﬁt sharing and employment security. The effects of those
human resource practices on turnover were considered in conjunction with
other contextual factors. Given the high unemployment rates in the Spanish
economy, informants argued that employment security offered by Eroski is a
key factor that ties coop owners to the company – as in other Mondragon
coops (Heras 2014). However, job security ties to the company not only the
highly engaged members, but also a number of members who are unsatisﬁed
but have no better employment alternatives.
If pay policy helps to explain the low turnover of most coop members, it
doesn’t explain the retention of managers. The principle of ‘wage solidarity’,
one of Mondragon’s cooperative principles, presupposes low pay differentials
in Mondragon cooperatives. The salary of the President of Eroski is limited
to 7.8 times the salary of the lower paid coop member, and the salary of the
CEO is limited to 7 times the lower rate. As a consequence, their salaries
are 72 per cent lower than in similar ﬁrms. Some 75 managers of ﬁrst and
second tiers of the organizational chart receive salaries that are 50–60 per
cent lower than in comparable size ﬁrms. Managers in each hypermarket
and most technicians in central offices, earn 10–20 per cent less than those
C© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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in competitors. Despite these levels of remuneration, voluntary turnover of
managers in Eroski remains very low (1 or 2 per cent per year among the
80–90 positions of maximum responsibility of Eroski S.Coop and 2 per cent
among hypermarket managers).
(c) Satisfaction and Attitudes
A further possible indicator is the attitude towage restraint. Since 2008, Eroski
has been facing challenging ﬁnancial problems. In order to help address these,
Eroski workingmembers have increasedworking hours and reduced their own
wages. According to interviewees, those decisions are a sign of high adhesion
and commitment levels:
We have just subjected the decision to reduce our pay to the vote of members. 92% of
members voted, and 79% said ‘yes’ to a reduction of their wage. The averagemember
is a cashier with a salary not much higher than 1,000 euro a month and has said yes
to reduce the salary. I think that this shows an extreme level of commitment and
adhesion. (Eroski Manager 2)
The explanation given by some managers to those high levels of
commitment is in line with Klein’s (1987) instrumental satisfaction model:
As a partner you have much more information, more data, you know how the
business is, you feel it is part of you. This allows you to take difficult steps like the
decision to increase our working hours and reduce our wages. (Eroski Manager 9)
However, as we will see, not all managerial analysis reﬂects such a
straightforward link between employee ownership participation and employee
attitudes and behaviours.
Apart from higher productivity and lower voluntary turnover, some of the
ﬁrst researchers of the ‘Mondragon Experience’ highlighted that absenteeism
rates of coop members were about half those in comparable local ﬁrms
(Bradley and Gelb 1981; Thomas and Logan 1982). However, three decades
on, the situation is quite different. In the speciﬁc case of Eroski, this
cooperative annually exceeds the sick leave payment goals established by
Mondragon’s corporate social provision body. Absenteeism rates of coop
members have been consistently higher than those of non-members since 2009
(see Table 3).
Given older workers tend to have more health problems, we considered
age differences as a control variable. The average age of coop members and
non-members was provided for three different years. In 2005, these were 37.02
for coop members versus 31.78 for non-members; in 2010, 40.46 versus 35.70
and in 2014, 43.66 versus 38.79. Interviewed managers considered that older
average age of members can explain some sick leaves, but it wouldn’t be a
major explanation for the differences seen on Table 3. In fact, the average age
of coop members was also higher in the 2005–2008 period when absenteeism
rates of coop members were no higher than those of permanent non-owner
workers.
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TABLE 3
Sick Leave Rates of Eroski Working Coop Members; Employees with Partial Ownership and
Non-Members (2005–2014)
Coop owners
Eroski S. Coop.
Employees with partial
ownership (since 2012 coop
owners of second degree coop)
Permanent
employees
Temporary
employees
2005 6.61% 6.52% 6.15% 2.52%
2006 6.36% 6.58% 7.19% 2.38%
2007 5.99% 6.01% 6.79% 2.95%
2008 5.40% 5.51% 6.45% 2.82%
2009 6.02% 5.12% 5.88% 1.98%
2010 7.21% 4.54% 5.48% 1.59%
2011 6.51% 4.08% 5.02% 1.50%
2012 5.26% 3.11% 4.05% 1.19%
2013 5.44% 2.96% 4.09% 1.32%
2014 5.82% 3.32% 4.69% 1.28%
Note: Sick leave rates = % of sick and accident leave hours/total working hours.
Source: Data gathered from the company.
Interviewed managers interpreted absenteeism rates as a ‘silent response’ of
some cooperative owners to austerity measures and were concerned about the
possible link between absenteeism, low commitment and shirking:
We think that a proportion of coop members are dissatisﬁed or have a low
commitment with their job and, when they get sick, they lengthen the time
they stay at home two days more than the average employee in society. (Eroski
Manager 6)
This idea thatmeasures such as absenteeismmay reﬂect a lack of responsible
engagement with the cooperative project goes to the heart of the debate about
behavioural outcomes of employee ownership. For example:
During the ﬁrst two years of the crisis, 2009–2010, there was a very strong reduction
in absenteeism within the non-cooperative subsidiaries of Eroski Group, but there
was a rise in the parent cooperative ﬁrm. That rise in absenteeism was a reﬂection of
discomfort on the part of the working members . . . as working members, having
a job virtually guaranteed allowed them to have that kind of reaction. (Eroski
Manager 6, emphasis added)
Higher productivity levels in the cooperative parent company imply higher
stress and workload for coop members. During the crisis there has been a
reduction in the number of non-owners working in the cooperative parent
company (as a sign of this reduction, wage costs of non-owners in Eroski
S.Coopwent from 47million euro to 28.5 million euro in 2009). This increased
the workload of cooperative workers. Most of the managers highlighted the
decision of coop members to increase their working hours (by 10 per cent in
2009, then lowered to a 5 per cent in 2011) and to reduce their wages as a
sign of high commitment, but some also highlighted that those measures have
a negative impact on satisfaction and absenteeism levels of many members.
Working longer hours, together with the increased number of tasks each
C© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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member has to handle in each store have generated fatigue and that would be
an important cause of higher absenteeism among coop owners in the 2009–
2014 period.
Employee Attitude Results
We found lower satisfaction rates of coop members as recorded in a series of
employee satisfaction surveys conducted in Eroski. The results of the 2006 and
the 2008 satisfaction surveys revealed lower satisfaction among coopmembers
signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level for the 2008 survey and at the 5 per cent
level for the 2006 survey (Arando et al. 2011; Luu 2011). They found lower
satisfaction across a range of measures including attitudes to recognition,
salary, labour conditions, information and communication, management
style, training, promotion, innovation, change management and so on.
The lower satisfaction is striking since those surveys came after a long
period of strong economic results and high levels of proﬁt sharing among coop
owners (Hernando 2013). Besides, coop members received higher pay, had
many more possibilities for participating in decision making and were subject
to a greater variety of initiatives normally associated with sophisticated
human resource management. The three-prong hypothesis was thus found to
be problematic in Eroski (Arando et al. 2011; Luu 2011). Such results were
attributed to higher expectations among members.
In order to explore these issues more deeply, we accessed the results of a
‘culture–leadership survey’ conducted in 2011. This surveyed 5,362 employees
of the cooperative parent company and 18,181 employees of subsidiaries. This
survey also included three questions to measure the satisfaction of employees
and four questions to measure their commitment. Perceptions of the
availability and strength of human resource policies (training, participation,
information and autonomy)were evaluated via three questions for each policy.
The comparative results between the different Eroski employee collectives
(coop owners, employees with partial ownership, permanent employees and
temporary employees) can be seen in Table 4.
Interviewed managers noted that most of the survey questions related to
satisfaction received a relatively high mark by employees and cooperative
owners (over 4 on a 1–6 scale). Those results, they argued, were better than
in most industrial cooperatives of Mondragon that use the same survey.
Nevertheless, as in the 2006 and 2008 surveys, satisfaction measured in 2011
for cooperative members was signiﬁcantly lower than for the other employee
categories. Commitment was also lower, especially when compared with
employees in subsidiaries with partial ownership.
Even if training, participation, autonomy and information opportunities
provided in the parent cooperative company to coop owners are higher
than those provided to employees with partial ownership in subsidiaries,
the perception of those policies by coop owners is poorer. Those poorer
perceptions of HR policies by coop members were also present in 2006 and
2008 Eroski satisfaction surveys analysed by Luu (2011) and Arando et al.
C© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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(2011). In the 2011 survey, the perception of one of the policies, training, is
lower for cooperative owners than for the rest of the employee groups.
Given the large sample sizes, even small differences are highly signiﬁcant,
mainly when we compare coop owners with employees of subsidiaries with
partial ownership. That is why we have measured the effect size. Low Cohen’s
d effect sizes in some of the HR policy items (cohen’s d < 0.3) suggest that
the differences between coop owners and employees without ownership on
different perception levels of HR policies are lower than previously predicted.
The effect of age or tenure on those different perceptions of HR policies was
not measured in these surveys.
Interviewed managers considered that raised, but unfulﬁlled, expectations
among coop members was the main cause for lower levels of satisfaction.
This reﬂects previous research (Arando et al. 2011; Ben-Ner and Jones 1995;
Klein and Hall 1988; Kruse and Blasi 1995; McCarthy et al. 2010). Another
reason, shared by most interviewed managers, for employee dissatisfaction
was the policy of egalitarianism and consequent subdued link between pay
and performance:
We consider everybody equally, independently of them doing a good, mediocre or
poor work. In other companies, if you do a better job, you have a bonus for your
individual performance. (Eroski Manager 1)
The way proﬁt sharing is conducted in Eroski, based in cooperative
principles, reinforces egalitarianism andmakes it difficult to see a link between
individual effort and ﬁnancial reward. One reason they cited for the failure
to make changes is the strong opposition from cooperative members sitting
on the governing bodies. Thus, the guardians (custodians) of the cooperative
system are seen to act as a brake on managers’ pragmatic commercial
instincts.
Informants argued that in the context of the ﬁnancial crisis it became
more necessary than ever to promote pay-for-performance but that they met
resistance:
I’ve had no more problems than when we tried to change the remuneration of
partners to differentiate it more. Yet the modiﬁcation was relatively minor. This year
a cornerstone in our strategic plan is to link pay and performance. We aim to do this
for survival. (Eroski Manager 2)
The ‘ideal’ of egalitarianism is seen as less tolerable when survival is at stake.
The implication is that the policy is perceived as an ideal which, in ‘normal
times’, is pursued for reasons other than commercial advantage. There is an
underlying tension in cooperative environments where the interdependence of
work contributions is valued and so group-based incentive schemes seem a
natural ﬁt. But, as equity theory would predict, workers as well as managers
may regard equal reward for unequal effort and contribution as unfair. In this
case however, managers believed that they were the ones being restricted in
taking the necessary measures to address this tension. Arguably, this reﬂected
a failure of communication.
C© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
308 British Journal of Industrial Relations
A related tension was found in the policy of employment security. This
also had dual effects. On the one hand, managers contended that they found
it difficult to sanction cases of poor performance. They suggested that this
prompted supervisors to shirk in their monitoring tasks:
We havemany supervisors not doing well what they have to do, which is to be exigent
with their teams and get results ( . . . ) He who wants to works, works, and the one
who doesn’t want to work, shirks. And the supervisor that has to say something
to the shirking member thinks: “why will I say something to him, if it’s going to
be a problem for me, if nobody will help me to make this guy work. There is no
current corporate culture that will encourage the manager to use tools of negative
discrimination, so you generate a culture of lack of demand, a culture of comfort.
(Eroski Manager 9)
Yet, on the other hand, a sense of employment security can have positive
effects including, for example, that it allows workers to exercise productive
voice (Freeman andMedoff 1984). However, the managers interviewed tended
not to make this counterbalancing point preferring instead to emphasize their
sense of restricted action.
Other factors mentioned were that engagement deteriorated over time; the
increased workload for members following the 2008 crisis; and there had been
a failure to build on the previous long period of success in order to foster
a culture of ‘pride of belonging’. One of the interviewees, experienced in
conducting employee surveys, offered an additional explanation: the ‘hyper-
critical attitude’ of coop owners and their willingness to voice complaints.
This attitude can lead to lower expressed satisfaction, even if conditions are
objectively equal or even better than for non-owners. This explanation is in
line with previous research comparing satisfaction of unionized versus non-
unionized workers (Freeman and Medoff 1984).
With these ﬁndings in mind we can now turn to the second case-study in
order to see whether similar patterns emerge.
5. Behavioural and attitudinal responses in the John Lewis Partnership
Productivity
The ﬁrst point to note in relation to JLP is that in terms of measures
of comparative commercial performance in recent years, it has been
extraordinarily successful. In a toughmarket where many competitor retailers
have folded and others have lost sales, JLP has been noted as bucking
the trend. In the media, its success is routinely attributed to its employee
ownership. In other words, one major possible positive outcome from the
employee-ownership effect might be sheer survival.
Commercial success there has certainly been. The Partnership continues to
grow year by year both in sales and in staff numbers. Table 5 summarises JLP’s
ﬁnancial performance since 2007.
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TABLE 5
JLP: Six-Year Performance Summary (£m)
Year 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007
Sales (£m) 10,172 9,541 8,730 8,206 7,422 6,968 6,763 6,362
Sales growth over
previous year (%)
6.6 9.3 6.4 10.6 6.5 3.0 6.3 –
Revenuea 9,028 8,466 7,759 7,362 6,735 6,267 6,052 5,686
Revenue growth over
previous year (%)
6.6 9.1 5.4 9.3 7.5 3.6 6.4 –
Net (post-tax) proﬁtsb 304 312 301 322 258 359c 320 263
Partnership bonus (£m) 203 211 165 195 151 125 181 154
Bonus (% of salaries) 15 17 14 18 15 13 20 18
Retained proﬁts (£m) 102 101 136 127 107 233b 130 108
aRevenue = Sales less VAT and ‘sale or return’ sales.
bProﬁts after tax but prior to Partnership Bonus.
cProﬁts affected by exceptional gain.
Hence, if one measures performance on the basis of sales, this co-owned
business is doing remarkably well: it enjoyed a 60 per cent growth in sales
between 2007 and 2014. This was a period of double dip recession in the
economy as a whole. There has also been consistent year on year growth in
partner numbers: from 76,800 in 2010 to 90,962 in 2013.
So, sales are evidently consistently healthy over long periods. However,
senior management remain convinced that they have not yet been able to
fully exploit the co-ownership potential. This is a constant theme. There is
more productivity to achieve, more efficiencies to be implemented. This is why
increasingly senior management emphasize not only the rights and rewards of
partners but their responsibilities. The level of managerial expectation of the
value to be gleaned from the Partnership model is high.
(a) Sickness Absence
Across the Partnership, sickness absence is lower than average compared
with the retail sector as a whole. The retail sector average in 2012 was 6.8
per cent and average rates across the economy in 2012–2013 were 7 per
cent (CIPD 2013). In the JLP Waitrose supermarkets division, the sickness
absence rate hovered around 3 per cent between 2010 and 2013, the John
Lewis Department store rates were the same. Corporate staff and those in
partnership services had even lower rates at around 1 per cent. The average
sickness absence rate in Waitrose in 2013 was 3.32 per cent this was a slight
increase over the 3.08 per cent of 2012. So, these data contrast with the
pattern found in Eroski. The explanation may be traced rather more to
management than to ownership per se.
(b) Attitudes and Satisfaction
If engagement can be indicated by attitude survey response rates then the JLP
scores are very high — averaging around 96 per cent. Staff newly recruited
to the Partnership — as in those instances where new branches are opened
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310 British Journal of Industrial Relations
— consistently award higher scores on all question items than established
members. For example, the advocacy question, ‘I would recommend the
partnership as a great place to work’, achieved a 92.9 per cent average positive
answer in the new branches in 2013 compared with 88.6 per cent in existing
branches (still an impressively high score). These data also suggest a novelty
effect and perhaps more demanding expectations of established partners.
Data was assembled which identiﬁed the highest scoring branches in the
partnership attitude surveys — that is, those branches where employees
reported they weremost satisﬁed and apparently more highly committed. This
revealed that the branches scoring highest on these surveys increased sales by
7 per cent per annum during the three-year period (2011–2013 inclusive). This
compared to an average sales increase across all branches during this period
of 3.5 per cent. Verbatim, free text, responses relating to local management
were: personal qualities such as showing trust and respect for partners, being
open and honest.When interacting with partners, these branchmanagers were
seen to take an interest in the partners, deal with questions in an open manner
and listen to partners. They also gave feedback and were seen to manage
performance.
Direct comparison can be made between Partners and non-partner
employees in the warehousing/Regional Distribution Centres (RDCs). Some
are operated by partners and some are outsourced to a provider company
(Kuehne and Nagel). The results show that the contractor company is just as
productive as the partner-operated sites. Managers tend to argue that the real
‘partnership difference’ is felt (and counts more) not so much in these support
roles but in the customer-facing settings of the selling ﬂoor.
The results of partner satisfaction surveys conducted in JLP in 2011, 2012
and 2013 show positive overall results compared to an external benchmarking
sample of 337 organizations. The survey shows, for each of the 35 questions,
a comparison with median and upper quartile responses of similar questions
by employees of the benchmarking sample. For 18 questions, satisfaction of
JLP partners is higher than the upper quartile of the sample and in 6 other
question areas the answers are over the median of the sample. Table 6 shows
some key examples.
As Table 6 shows, the Partnership even as a large employer with around
90,000 employees records some well-above average scores when compared
with benchmark companies. The value of the beneﬁts stand out as a distinctive
feature. Some 95 per cent of respondents answered in a positive way to this
which compared very favourably with only 47 per cent of median responses
in benchmark companies and 6 per cent of upper quartile companies. JLP is
likewise seen as ‘a great place to work’ and as a socially responsible employer.
These are, perhaps, as expected for a well-known, employee-owned
organisation. And yet, as with the Eroski case, the results are not always in
the positive direction. On the contrary, there are some surprising patterns as
shown in Table 7.
As Table 7 shows, the Partnership scores relatively low marks in some
items in which there should be an employee-owned advantage: teamwork,
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communication, acknowledgement, participation, ideas welcomed. On the
face of it, these are all surprising results.
The most obvious explanation of these lower scores relative to the
benchmark ﬁrms is that JLP staff have been encouraged to believe that
their organization should be exemplary in these regards. In other words, the
baseline of expectations is much higher than in comparative ﬁrms where
expectation on such dimensionsmay bemuch lower. There is some evidence to
support this thesis in the tendency for staff in retail outlets acquired by JLP to
record very high satisfaction rates in the ﬁrst couple of years after take-over.
But, there could possibly be another reason: increasingly, managers appear to
be taking the important decisions and the long-standing partners with longer
memories may be expressing their displeasure at this development.
Also on the negative side, it seems that even if JLP managers are able to
engage partners in day to day work, it is more difficult to engage them in
participation on democratic bodies:
Frommy experience, only a fraction of the workforce actually engages with councils
and partner voice or believes it’s effective and actually buys into it. There is apathy
towards the councils. Whether you say it’s 50% of partners or two-thirds of partners
are apathetic, it’s a big chunk of the workforce. (JLP Manager)
It seems that peer-monitoring plays a bigger role in JLP than in Eroski. In
part, this is linked to a pay for performance system that is criticized in many
interviews as insufficient:
The Partnership is completing a review of its pay policy regarding pay for
performance. There are partners who clearly recognise that we don’t performance
manage well, and it articulates itself at a local level around partners not liking to be
taken for a ride for somebody who’s off sick, but they know they were out the night
before and couldn’t get up in the morning. It’s also come in because there’s a feeling
that we haven’t got the link right between pay and performance. (JLP Manager)
The limited pay differentials issue was also found in JLP though to a far
lesser extent than in Eroski. Part of the reason here is that the scope for pay
differentials is much higher in JLP. The highest salary in JLP is limited to
75 times the average pay of a selling partner (a huge contrast with the 7.8 to
1 differential in Eroski). These higher pay differentials in JLP have enabled
it to attract high-performing managers from competing ﬁrms. Hence, JLP is
not reliant on internal promotion. Access to leading-edge knowledge is made
available and the competition among managers means that there is far less
scope for complacency.
One director identiﬁed three components of the JLP model and insisted
that the basis was the collective ownership even if it was not the whole story.
Ownership gave commitment and engagement, it also promoted trust because
the business was not run on the basis of exploitation of one group of another.
And shared ownership allows a basis for investment decisions of a long term
nature.
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Ownership is mediated through a whole series of institutions, structural
and normative, to achieve its full impact. There is a psychological and moral
implication. As one senior manager commented, ‘when you own the place
you make sure the lights are off when everyone leaves a room’. The sense of
ownership was thus regarded as hugely important as a source of discretionary
effort. But, paradoxically, managers also argued that partners’ commitment
and system efficiency could be negatively related; the reason being that high
commitment and exceptional discretionary effort by individuals and teams
may be used to compensate for process and system inefficiencies.
The overall managerial analysis was that while JLP builds on an emotional
base of ownership, ultimately it is the contribution from leadership that
matters. Without leadership, it was claimed, there is a tendency for co-owned
businesses to become too complacent.
The JLP case suggests that employee ownership is used as a foundation
upon which can be built a complex array of interlocking values, meanings,
performance management methods and a rationale for leadership.
6. Discussion and conclusions
We began the analysis by noting that a key rationale for employee-owned
enterprises is the idea that workers in such enterprises would be more engaged
and would be inclined to expend discretionary effort for the success of the
enterprise. In other words, they would take-on many of the attributes of
conventional owners. To an extent we found this to be true but, in addition, we
have noted the perceived minuses of employee ownership and the way some
managers tended to give voice to these.
As a reaction to the mixed results arising from research based on the simple
ownership variable, more sophisticated analyses have been undertaken. Most
notably, these have included exploration of the ‘three-pronged’ hypothesis
(Kruse et al. 2004; Kaarsemaker and Poustma 2006). This underscored the
necessity of complementing employee ownership with increased employee
participation in decisionmaking andwith supportive human resource policies.
We sought to contribute to this body of literature by helping to explain
why some empirical studies such as those by Arando et al. (2011) and Luu
(2011) have produced results which appear not to support the three-pronged
hypothesis.
The methodology used in our study, and mainly the information obtained
from interviewed managers, allows us to shed some additional light on
this debate. As a consequence, we do not consider that the ‘three pronged
hypothesis’ actually does fail in the cases of Eroski and JLP. The reason
for some of the negative attitudinal and behavioural responses of employee
owners in Eroski could be that some of the human resource policies considered
as ‘innovative’ by previous researchers, also generate some negative outcomes.
We also ﬁnd that some environmental factors, not considered in previous
research, also explain in part some negative outcomes in Eroski and that
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some Eroski managers tended to give emphasis to the restrictive elements of
cooperative enterprises especially in an economic context which they saw as
requiring decisive adaptive action.
Eroski managers argued that the employment security policy can promote
‘complacency’ – an argument also found in JLP. The patterns and causal
relationships found in both cases allow us to support some of the theoretical
and empirical research that has been reported in relation to behaviours
in employee owned ﬁrms. In both cases, we ﬁnd some positive responses
to employee ownership running alongside negative scores based on higher
expectations. In addition, we found a tendency, especially among Eroski
managers, to take for granted the positive attributes of co-ownership. As a
result, these managers were inclined to emphasize the restrictive elements as
far asmanagerial actionwas concerned and to discount the positive aspects. In
JLP, there was an established cultural expectation formanagers to rehearse the
positive attributes. In addition, JLP managers had built an acceptance of the
legitimacy and need for agile responses to commercial pressures – including,
for example, redundancies in special circumstances, subject to due process.
Klein’s extrinsic satisfaction model suggests that employee ownership
increases commitment if it is materially rewarding for employees – something
that was true in both companies until 2008. But the situation has not been
like this in Eroski for the 2009–2015 period. Instead of proﬁt sharing and
receiving interests for the capital invested in the company as in the past, coop
members in Eroski have had to face ‘extornos’ or loss sharing, together with
wage reductions and increasing working hours. Those decisions have been
‘supported’ by a hugemajority of votingmembers (in terms of votes). This was
interpreted by managers as a sign of commitment. Yet, at the same time, the
resulting measures have generated dissatisfaction and a growing absenteeism
rate. Such responses have not been analysed in previous Mondragon
literature.
Limitations arising from the methodology need to be borne in mind. The
ﬁrst point to note is that the cases researched represent two of the biggest
and longer lasting employee owned companies in the world. Those kinds of
companies are scarce and many of our ﬁndings may be difficult to replicate
in much smaller employee-owned companies. Second, in addition to the
empirical data on absenteeism, employee turnover and employee satisfaction
survey results, we gave special attention to theways in whichmanagerial actors
made sense of these data and employee ownership effects more generally. In
interview situations these informants tended to emphasise the restrictions on
managerial action and in so doing they tended to take for granted the positive
aspects of employee ownership.
However, the beneﬁts of our methodology were that in selecting two
successful and long-standing cases in different international cultural contexts
wewere able to assess developments over time and across economic cycles. The
two cases were in similar industry sectors and they shared many attributes.
Even the researchers that have analysed the resilience of Mondragon
cooperatives have usually ignored that fact that the austerity measures
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that allow resilience (lower wages, longer working hours) also impact on
dissatisfaction. A recent Mondragon internal analysis (Ortega and Uriarte
2015) which seeks to explain why its biggest and oldest industrial cooperative,
Fagor Electrodome´sticos, failed in 2013, allows insight into some of the
negative attitudinal and behavioural responses – such as emotional distance
of the coop owner towards the cooperative, complacency and shirking, and
a readiness to voice demands. Together with other negative outcomes such
as low self-responsibility and supervisors shirking their monitoring tasks,
these problems resonate with those we have identiﬁed in Eroski. Likewise, an
analysis of the failure of Fagor Electrodome´sticos (Ortega and Uriarte 2015)
noted that egalitarianism between coops and maintaining similar pay levels
in both successful and unsuccessful companies through inter-cooperative
solidarity had impeded a rapid response when the ﬁrst symptoms of the
crisis appeared. In other words, attributes of strengths also contained seeds
of weaknesses.
Kaarsemaker and Poustma (2006) and Caramelli (2011) stress the need
of new research to account for environmental factors. The effect of
environmental factors in Eroski (low dynamism of Basque and Spanish
labour markets, high unemployment rates) partially explains the extremely
low voluntary turnover rates. While low voluntary turnover can be a positive
indicator, under some circumstances it can also be a negative one. The more
dynamic labour market in the parts of the United Kingdomwhere JLPmainly
operates (the affluent south) makes it easier for dissatisﬁed partners to leave
the company.
The research in John Lewis revealed that managers were alive to the
commercial potential of the co-ownership model and took many active
steps to realize its potential. They invested heavily in the model through
ensuring the health of the partner democracy structures and procedures.
They intervened to periodically revitalize the democratic features to counter
any drift to atrophy. Further, they invested heavily in communication of the
meaning of the partnership. The Partnership had to be ‘nicer’ (taking into
full account the interests of its members) but it also had to be ‘better’ (in
all respects including customers service and the shopping experience as a
whole) than the competition. The two were part of one whole. The key point
was that the managers added a very strong ‘fourth prong’ — namely, an
extraordinarily active managerial input to shore-up the employee-ownership
mechanisms and crucially to interpret and continually reinterpret its
‘meaning’.
Thus, each of the prongs of employee ownership are required
(intrinsic/emotional attachment to the idea of being an owner, the accrual of
ﬁnancial reward from ownership and associated effort, and the participation
which ownership rights confer) but on their own these may still not be enough.
Alongside an emphasis on external economic and social factors, we have
added a governing inner-contextual factor — the inﬂuence of management in
harnessing the employee ownership idea, breathing life and meaning into it,
investing in the necessary support systems to make it real, and, most of all,
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communicating a sense of direction and legitimacy to a version of industrial
democracy which is viable and sustainable.
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Notes
1. Since 1997 Eroski offered partial employee ownership in different subsidiaries. In
2012, following a re-cooperativization process, close to 4,000 employees with partial
ownership in hypermarket subsidiaries were offered the possibility of becoming
cooperative owners (Storey et al. 2014).
2. Some of the 35 questions of the Partner Survey are broadly used in satisfaction
surveys everywhere; while others aremore speciﬁc to the culture and idiosyncrasy of
the ﬁrm. Thus, the size of the external benchmarking sample differs from question
to question
3. The number of employees without ownership gathered in the interviews sums
permanent and temporary employees, since these data weren’t available for 2007
(acquisition of Caprabo by Eroski) and for some other years.
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